A democratic preference aggregation model by Ismat Beg & Tabasam Rashid
Beg and Rashid Journal of Uncertainty Analysis and Applications 2013, 1:5
http://www.juaa-journal.com/content/1/1/5
RESEARCH Open Access
A democratic preference aggregation model
Ismat Beg1* and Tabasam Rashid2,3
*Correspondence:
begismat@yahoo.com
1Centre for Mathematics and
Statistical Sciences, Lahore School of
Economics, Lahore 53200,Pakistan
Full list of author information is
available at the end of the article
Abstract
We propose a democratic preference aggregation function using trapezoidal fuzzy
numbers. Examples are constructed to illustrate the proposed technique to optimize
the problem by avoiding paradoxical outcomes without the fear of indecision.
2010 Mathematics Subject Classification: 91B52; 03B52
Keywords: Democracy; Preference aggregation; Condorcet paradox; Doctrinal
paradox; Trapezoidal fuzzy number
Background
Democracy is based on the idea that groups make better decisions than individuals.
However, majority voting is unable to ensure consistent social positions under all sit-
uations. How individual preferences can be aggregated into a collectively preferred
alternative is recently studied by Arrow [1] and Sen [2]. In economics and formal episte-
mology, aggregation of individual preferences on logically related basic propositions into
a collective preference is an emerging research area. Decision theory also studies the indi-
vidual preference aggregation method. Preference aggregation is defined in social choice
theory as forming a collective preference in a given set of alternatives. There are two kinds
of proposition: the first kind is the premises and the other is the conclusion. Consider,
for example, in a city traffic police department, there is a committee of five inspectors to
decide to issue a driving license. The decision rule is such that a candidate C will be issued
a driving license only if the candidate is physically fit and good in driving. We will say
that issuing of a driving license to C is the conclusion (denoted by proposition D, result-
ing decision) while physically fit (denoted by proposition P) and good in driving (denoted
by proposition Q) are the premises. The decision rule can be expressed in the formula
(P∧Q) ←→ D. Each inspector of the committee expresses his preference on P, Q, and D
such that the rule (P ∧ Q) ←→ D is satisfied.
How shall we derive a group decision given the individuals’ opinions on premises and
conclusion? Assume that each individual expresses preference in the form of a binary
decision (Yes/No) on the propositions. If we define the decision as the majority voting,
then we may reach an inconsistent position, as shown in Table 1. In the literature on
preference aggregation, such a problem is known as discursive dilemma and doctrinal
paradox.
Although each inspector expresses a consistent preference, proposition-wise majority
voting results in a majority for P and Q but a majority for ¬D, which is an inconsistent
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Table 1 Discursive dilemma and doctrinal paradox
P Q (P ∧Q) ←→ D D
Inspectors 1 and 5 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inspectors 2 and 4 Yes No Yes No
Inspector 3 No Yes Yes No
Majority Yes Yes Yes ?
collective result as it violates the rule (P ∧ Q) ←→ D. The paradox rests with the fact
that proposition-wise majority voting can lead a group of rational individuals to endorse
an inconsistent collective preference. Such aggregation problems go beyond the specific
example: it can be observed in all situations where individual binary decisions need to be
combined into a preference of the group.
Condorcet [3] was the first to initiate a research on social choice theory that individual
preferences can be aggregated into a collectively preferred alternative. Condorcet made
a result that majority voting was a good method for a collectively preferred alternative,
but they also found a problem in majority voting method. He suggested a method which
is consisted of the pairwise comparison of each alternative. Majority voting decides the
winner in each pair, and the collective result is obtained by the combination of all partial
results.
Consider, for example, there are three alternatives x, y, and z and five voters V1, V2, V3,
V4, and V5. Let i denote voter Vi’s preference over X = {x, y, z} and  denote the collec-
tive preference result over X. V1 = {x 1 y, y 1 z}, V2 = {y 2 z, z 2 x}, V3 = {z 3 x,
x 3 y}, V4 = {y 2 z, z 2 x}, and V5 = {x 1 y, y 1 z} are the five voters’ preferences
(see Table 2). Transitivity holds for each voter’s preference, but unfortunately transitivity
does not hold for collective preference ‘VS ’ (by majority method). This situation is called
the Condorcet paradox.
When we combine individual decisions into a collective decision, we may have to face
inconsistency in the collective level, like logical consistency and transitivity (in preference
aggregation).
Realistic collective decision problems are handled with some extension beyond binary
propositional logic into the realm of general multivalued logic (see [4-7]). Duddy and
Piggins also used extension in propositional logic in degrees [8]. Beg and Butt [5] proved
the (im)possibility theorem in fuzzy logic, similar to those of Arrow [1] and Sen [2]. There
cannot exist any preference aggregation procedure that simultaneously satisfies certain
consistency conditions [9].
Often, human preference is ambiguous and vague and cannot be estimated with an
exact numeric value, so the binary values are not suitable to model real-world situa-
tions. Bellman and Zadeh [10] used the concept of fuzzy set theory to handle imprecision
(or uncertainty) to solve the ambiguity and vagueness in human preference. Fuzzy logic
Table 2 Condorcet paradox
x  y y  x y  z z  y x  z z  x
V1 and V5 1 0 1 0 1 0
V2 and V4 0 1 1 0 0 1
V3 1 0 0 1 0 1
VS 1 0 1 0 0 1
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can help in aggregation procedures to make the collective preference set democratic in
nature. Trapezoidal fuzzy numbers are the best way to model preferences. Recently, a lot
of work on trapezoidal fuzzy numbers has been done by Li et al. [11-13]. In this paper,
trapezoidal fuzzy numbers are used for the truth value of the proposition. The rest of the
paper is structured as follows: In the ‘Methods’ section, some basic relations and oper-
ations for trapezoidal fuzzy numbers are given and problems are reformulated in the
setting of trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. The ‘Results’ section illustrates how the paradoxes
are resolved in trapezoidal fuzzy numbers to find democratic fuzzy aggregation function.
The ‘Discussion’ section presents the discussion in utility maximization. Conclusion of
the whole work is given in the last section.
Methods
In some problems, propositions are vague and thus can have truth values between true
and false. Beg and Butt [6] tried to use fuzzy logic for the solution of doctrinal and
Condercet paradoxes. We can use trapezoidal fuzzy numbers to model the vagueness of
human knowledge.




0 if x < x1or x > x4,
x−x1
x2−x1 if x1 ≤ x < x2,
1 if x2 ≤ x < x3,
x−x4
x3−x4 if x3 ≤ x ≤ x4,
where x1 < x2 < x3 < x4, is called a trapezoidal fuzzy number. Symbolically, A is denoted
by (x1, x2, x3, x4) (see p. 330 in [14]).
Let D[0, 1] denote the set of all trapezoidal fuzzy numbers such that 0 ≤ x1 and x4 ≤ 1.
We assume that individual preferences take values on D[0, 1].
Definition 2.2. ([15]) We define an operator  on trapezoidal fuzzy numbers, which is
given by
AB = (0 ∨ (x1 + y1 − 1), 0 ∨ (x2 + y2 − 1), 0 ∨ (x3 + y3 − 1), 0 ∨ (x4 + y4 − 1)),
where A = (x1, x2, x3, x4), B = (y1, y2, y3, y4), and A,B ∈ D[ 0, 1]. Also, A = B if x1 = y1,
x2 = y2, x3 = y3, and x4 = y4.
Definition 2.3. The constant ‘k’multiple of trapezoidal fuzzy number A is defined as
kA = k(x1, x2, x3, x4) = (k × x1, k × x2, k × x3, k × x4) where A = (x1, x2, x3, x4),
A ∈ D[0, 1], and k ∈[0, 1] .
Definition 2.4. ([15]) The relation 	 in D[0, 1] is introduced as follows: Let A =
(x1, x2, x3, x4), B = (y1, y2, y3, y4), and A,B ∈ D[0, 1] :
If x4 < y4, then A ≺ B;
If x4 = y4 and
(i) x3 < y3, then A ≺ B;
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(ii) x3 = y3 and
(a) x2 < y2, then A ≺ B;
(b) x2 = y2 and x1 < y1, then A ≺ B.
Obviously, D[ 0, 1] is an ordered set.
Definition 2.5. ([15]) In D[0, 1] ,
min(A,B) = (min(x1, y1), min(x2, y2), min(x3, y3), min(x4, y4))
and
max(A,B) = (max(x1, y1), max(x2, y2), max(x3, y3), max(x4, y4))
are called min and max operators for trapezoidal fuzzy numbers, respectively.
Definition 2.6. ([15]) A fuzzy implication =⇒ for trapezoidal fuzzy numbers is a map
=⇒: D[0, 1]×D[0, 1]→ D[0, 1]
satisfying
(i) [ (0, 0, 0, 0) =⇒ (0, 0, 0, 0)]= (1, 1, 1, 1),
(ii) [ (0, 0, 0, 0) =⇒ (1, 1, 1, 1)]= (1, 1, 1, 1),
(iii) [ (1, 1, 1, 1) =⇒ (0, 0, 0, 0)]= (0, 0, 0, 0),
(iv) [ (1, 1, 1, 1) =⇒ (0, 0, 0, 0)]= (1, 1, 1, 1).





(1 − max(|x1 − y1|, |x2 − y2|, |x3 − y3|, |x4 − y4|),
1 − max(|x1 − y1|, |x2 − y2|, |x3 − y3|, |x4 − y4|),
1 − min(|x1 − y1|, |x2 − y2|, |x3 − y3|, |x4 − y4|),
1 − min(|x1 − y1|, |x2 − y2|, |x3 − y3|, |x4 − y4|))
(1, 1, 1, 1) ; if A 	 B.
; if A  B
Definition 2.7. The weighted average operator ‘avg’ of trapezoidal fuzzy numbers is
defined as follows: Let A1 = (x11, x12, x13, x14), A2 = (x21, x22, x23, x24), . . ., An = (xn1,
xn2, xn3, xn4), and A1, A2, . . ., An ∈ D[ 0, 1] :
avg(A1,A2, . . . ,An)
=
(w1 × x11 + w2 × x21 + · · · + wn × xn1
w1 + w2 + · · · + wn ,
w1 × x12 + w2 × x22 + · · · + wn × xn2
w1 + w2 + · · · + wn ,
w1 × x13 + w2 × x23 + · · · + wn × xn3
w1 + w2 + · · · + wn ,
w1 × x14 + w2 × x24 + · · · + wn × xn4
w1 + w2 + · · · + wn
)
,
where wi is the weight assigned to truth value Ai.
Note that if wi = 1 for all i, then avg(A1, A2, . . . , An) is denoted by average(A1, A2, . . . ,
An).
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Example 2.8. Here we reformulate our problem in a trapezoidal fuzzy number, which is
illustrated and summarized in Table 1. Table 3 is a clear illustration of Table 1 for trape-
zoidal fuzzy numbers and also the average of inspectors’ decision for each proposition. In
this case, we get at least one solution of doctrinal paradox for trapezoidal fuzzy numbers.
One important property of majority selection: min((0.45, 0.48, 0.54, 0.59), (0.15, 0.19,
0.27, 0.31), (0.75, 0.79, 0.85, 0.89)) 	 (θ1(x1), θ1(x2), θ1(x3), θ1(x4)) 	 max((0.45, 0.48,
0.54, 0.59), (0.15, 0.19, 0.27, 0.31), (0.75, 0.79, 0.85, 0.89)), min((0.61, 0.65, 0.71, 0.75),
(0.61, 0.65, 0.71, 0.75), (0.05, 0.09, 0.16, 0.22)) 	 (θ2(x1), θ2(x2), θ2(x3), θ2(x4)) 	
max((0.61, 0.65, 0.71, 0.75), (0.61, 0.65, 0.71, 0.75), (0.05, 0.09, 0.16, 0.22)), and min((0.45,
0.48, 0.54, 0.59), (0.15, 0.19, 0.27, 0.31), (0.05, 0.09, 0.16, 0.22)) 	 (θ3(x1), θ3(x2), θ3(x3),
θ3(x4)) 	 max((0.45, 0.48, 0.54, 0.59), (0.15, 0.19, 0.27, 0.31), (0.05, 0.09, 0.16, 0.22)) is in
Table 3.
Simply, (0.15, 0.19, 0.27, 0.31) 	 (θ1(x1), θ1(x2), θ1(x3), θ1(x4)) 	 (0.75, 0.79, 0.85, 0.89),
(0.05, 0.09, 0.16, 0.22) 	 (θ2(x1), θ2(x2), θ2(x3), θ2(x4)) 	 (0.61, 0.65, 0.71, 0.75) and (0.05,
0.09, 0.16, 0.22) 	 (θ3(x1), θ3(x2), θ3(x3), θ3(x4)) 	 (0.45, 0.48, 0.54, 0.59) such that 0.15
≤ θ1(x1) ≤ 0.75, 0.19 ≤ θ1(x2) ≤ 0.79, 0.27 ≤ θ1(x3) ≤ 0.85, 0.31 ≤ θ1(x4) ≤ 0.89, 0.05
≤ θ2(x1) ≤ 0.61, 0.09 ≤ θ2(x2) ≤ 0.65, 0.16 ≤ θ2(x3) ≤ 0.71, 0.22 ≤ θ2(x4) ≤ 0.75, 0.05 ≤
θ3(x1) ≤ 0.45, 0.09 ≤ θ3(x2) ≤ 0.48, 0.16 ≤ θ3(x3) ≤ 0.54, and 0.22 ≤ θ3(x4) ≤ 0.59, but
the values of θi(xj) will satisfy the condition for trapezoidal fuzzy numbers of D[ 0, 1].
At the same time, let π(P) denote the degree of truth of the proposition P, and the fuzzy
integrity constraint is {π(P)π(Q) =⇒ π(R)}. Suppose that the committee members are
rational and they never violate the fuzzy integrity constraints (IC) (see List [16]). Now
by using the above given  operator and fuzzy implication =⇒, the IC can be translated
as π(R) ≥ max(0,π(P) + π(Q) − 1): Here π(R) = fi(π(P), π(Q)) is a particular rule of
inference for individual i (see [17] ).
Results
We assume that decision makers are rational and they have freedom to fully express their
opinions on a proposition with which they do not agree or disagree. So any number from
D[ 0, 1] that best representstheir opinions can be opted. A finite set of n individuals and
a finite set X of propositions over which individuals have to make their preferences are
called an agenda. A preference set Ai for an individual i is an n-tuple containing the
degree of truth for each proposition. Let Ai = (hi1, hi2, . . . , hi|X|), where |X| denotes the
Table 3 Revisit of Table 1 for trapezoidal fuzzy numbers
P Q R (PQ) =⇒ R
Inspectors 1 and 5 (0.45, 0.48, (0.61, 0.65, (0.45, 0.48, (1, 1, 1, 1)
0.54, 0.59) 0.71, 0.75) 0.54, 0.59)
Inspectors 2 and 4 (0.15, 0.19, (0.61, 0.65, (0.15, 0.19, (1, 1, 1, 1)
0.27, 0.31) 0.71, 0.75) 0.27, 0.31)
Inspector 3 (0.75, 0.79, (0.05, 0.09, (0.05, 0.09, (1, 1, 1, 1)
0.85, 0.89) 0.16, 0.22) 0.16, 0.22)
Average (0.45, 0.49, (0.42, 0.46, (0.22, 0.25, (1, 1, 1, 1)
0.55, 0.60) 0.53, 0.57) 0.32, 0.37)
Majority (θ1 (x1), θ1(x2), (θ2 (x1), θ2(x 2), (θ3(x1 ), θ3(x2), (1, 1, 1, 1)
θ1(x3), θ1 (x4)) θ2(x3), θ2(x4 )) θ3(x3), θ3(x4))
Beg and Rashid Journal of Uncertainty Analysis and Applications 2013, 1:5 Page 6 of 11
http://www.juaa-journal.com/content/1/1/5
cardinality of X and hij ∈ D[0, 1] for j ∈ (1, 2, . . . , |X|). A profile is an n-tuple (A1, A2, . . . ,
An) of individual preference sets. Function f is an aggregation that assigns to each profile
(A1, A2, . . . , An) a collective preference set (h∗1, h∗2, . . . , h∗|X|) = f (A1, A2, . . . , An). Here
h∗j ∈ D[ 0, 1] for j ∈ (1, 2, . . . , |X|).
The truth value of some proposition ϕ ∈ X for the preference set Ai is Ai(ϕ). The truth
value of some proposition ϕ ∈ X for the collective preference set f (A1, A2, . . . , An) is
f (A1, A2, . . . , An)(ϕ) = f (A1(ϕ),A2(ϕ), . . . ,An(ϕ)).
If f (A1, A2, . . . , An) = Ai for some i ∈ (1, 2, . . . , n) and every (A1, A2, . . . , An), then f is
‘dictatorship.’
Function f is ‘manipulable’ if and only if there exist some voter i, proposition ϕ, and
profile (A1,A2, . . . ,An) such thatAi(ϕ) = f (A1,A2, . . . ,Ai, . . . ,An)(ϕ), butAi(ϕ) = f (A1,
A2, . . . , A∗i , . . . , An)(ϕ) for some alternate preference set A∗i .
Function f is ‘independent’ if and only if for all propositions ϕ ∈ X there is a function
gϕ : D[ 0, 1]n → D[ 0, 1] such that for all (A1, A2, . . . , An), we have f (A1, A2, . . . , An)(ϕ) =
gϕ(A1(ϕ), A2(ϕ), . . . , An(ϕ)).
Preference aggregation formally investigates how to aggregate a finite number of pref-
erence bases into a collective one. This formal framework consists of a propositional
language ℵwhich is built up from a finite set P of propositional letters standing for atomic
propositions. An interpretation is a function from P to D[ 0, 1]. Function π(.) represents
the truth function that maps elements in set P to D[ 0, 1]. Let the preference base Ki for
the agent i be the following set (πi(p1), πi(p2), . . . , πi(p|P|)), where |P| denotes the cardi-
nality of P. A preference set is the set E = {K1, K2, . . . , Kn}. Given a set of IC in a fuzzy
setting, ψ maps E and IC into a new (collective) preference base ψIC(E), and this process
is called fuzzy aggregation for trapezoidal fuzzy numbers.
LetW denote the set of all interpretations and the distance between interpretations is
a real-valued function
d : W × W → 
such that for all w,w′,w′′ ∈ W :
1. d(w,w′) ≥ 0.
2. d(w,w′) = 0 if and only if w = w′.
3. d(w,w′) = d(w′,w).
4. d(w,w′′) ≤ d(w,w′) + d(w′,w′′).








(|w(x1) − w′(x1)| + |w(x2) − w′(x2)|
+ |w(x3) − w′(x3)| + |w(x4) − w′(x4)|).




(w(x1) − w′(x1))2 + (w(x2) − w′(x2))2
+ (w(x3) − w′(x3))2 + (w(x4) − w′(x4))2).
Beg and Rashid Journal of Uncertainty Analysis and Applications 2013, 1:5 Page 7 of 11
http://www.juaa-journal.com/content/1/1/5
Now let us define a preference aggregation operator in this framework. For any inter-
pretation w ∈ W and any profile of preference basis K ∈ Kn, the distance between an





Our objective is to choose w which minimizes this distance and does not violate any IC
in the fuzzy setting. To minimize the distance is the same as to minimize a measure of
disagreement in the society by bringing the collective preference set close to the individ-
ual preference sets as possible. Individual disagreement brings about individual disutility.
Thus, we seek to minimize the societal disutility which is assumed to be the sum of indi-
vidual disutilities. We have many distance and dissimilarity measures in the literature like
distance ‘dh’ [18], distances ‘dLR’ and ‘df ’ [19,20], distance ‘DMLR’ [21], etc. In this paper,
we have chosen the Hamming distance d∗ and square distance d∗∗. Choosing any dis-
tance or dissimilarity measure is solely at our discretion provided that it satisfies certain
normative principles.
Let w be any arbitrary interpretation. In this case, w(P) = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θ|P|), where we
have θi ∈ D[ 0, 1] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |P| and |P| denotes the cardinality of P.
We can think a collective preference set F¯ which is the weighted average of individual
preference sets. We believe that the closer our collective preference set F is to F¯ , the more
legitimate and democratic is our final preference. Now we assert that an optimal fuzzy
aggregation function is democratic if the solution is as close as possible to the average
of individual preferences. Such a view is held only for the purpose of illustration in our
paper, and there could be different possible ways for democratization.
A fuzzy aggregation function is democratic as well as optimal if we make the solution
of Table 3 as close as possible to the avg(inspector 1, inspector 2, inspector 3, inspector
4, inspector 5). This could be easily achieved by adding the penalty to the objective func-
tion. Here we use the distance function d(w,avg) as penalty. So d(w,avg) is the degree of
democracy.
Now d∗ is a generalization of the Hamming distance, and we can use it in trapezoidal
fuzzy numbers to avoid the doctrinal paradox. We can formulate the fuzzy aggregation as








subject to the fuzzy IC.
Here w(P) = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θ|P|), min{K1(j), K2(j), . . . , Kn(j)} ≤ θj ≤ max{K1(j), K2(j), . . . ,
Kn(j)}, and θj ∈ D[ 0, 1] for j ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , |P|}, where Ki(j) denotes the jth element of the
preference base Ki.
The above optimization problem helps us to avoid doctrinal paradox and find an opti-
mal fuzzy aggregation function. We say that an aggregation function is optimal if the
collective preference set is close to the individual preference set and weighted average of
individual preference sets as possible. Finding a collective social choice function in Table 3
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now becomes an optimization problem which can have multiple optimal solutions. The
problem in Table 3 can be democratized in d∗ and d∗∗. The optimal fuzzy aggregation
function gives the solution for Table 3 as (θ1, θ2, θ3) = ((0.45, 0.48, 0.54, 0.59), (0.42, 0.621,
0.621, 0.621), (0.151, 0.249, 0.32, 0.367)) with minimum Dd∗ + d∗(w,average) = 1.8527.
The optimal fuzzy aggregation function gives the solution for Table 3 as (θ1, θ2, θ3) =
((0.45, 0.487, 0.553, 0.598), (0.422, 0.462, 0.462, 0.572), (0.217, 0.252, 0.405, 0.405)) with
minimum Dd∗∗ + d∗∗(w, average) = 1.9164. The fact that there is at least one solution to
the problem shows that doctrinal paradox cannot occur in this case.
We like our aggregation procedure to be strategy proof. Impossibility theorems proved
by Dietrich and List [22] were similar to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem on strategy-
proof aggregation rules. Given these theorems, we do not claim that our distance-based
aggregation method is strategy proof. In fact, Dietrich [9] has proved that independence
and monotonicity are properties of an aggregator that result in strategy proofness. Since
we do not claim that our distance-based aggregator is independent and monotone simul-
taneously, the strategy proofness of our aggregator is clear. The nature of our objective
function in the optimization problem is such that if an individual was to submit an insin-
cere preference (in an attempt to manipulate the collective preference), any deviation of
the collective preference set from this insincere preference has a penalty in the objective
function. In this situation, there appears to be a partial corrective mechanism whereby
our aggregation method is not easily prone to manipulation.
Example 3.1. Here we reformulate our problem in trapezoidal fuzzy number form,
which is illustrated and summarized in Table 2. Table 4 is a clear illustration of Table 2
for trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. Also, the average of voters’ decision for each proposition
is calculated. Now we get at least one solution of the Condorcet paradox for trapezoidal
fuzzy numbers. Suppose that the individuals have a preference structure as shown in
Table 4.
Now consider Table 4. Assume that there is a small economy with three individu-
als and three goods x, y, and z. Individual binary relations over X = {x, y, z}, namely
V1,V2,V3,V4, and V5, are linear orders. Any optimal fuzzy social preference aggregation
function maps the individual preference set into a social preference set that must be a
linear order. Accordingly, this becomes an optimization problem which minimizes the
sum of the distances of social preference from the individual preferences and weighted
Table 4 Revisit of Table 2 for trapezoidal fuzzy numbers
x  y y  x y  z z  y x  z z  x
V1 and V5 (0.45,0.48, (0.15,0.19, (0.45,0.48, (0.05,0.09, (0.39,0.42, (0.15,0.19,
0.54,0.59) 0.27,0.31) 0.54,0.59) 0.16,0.22) 0.44,0.48) 0.27,0.31)
V2 and V4 (0.75,0.79, (0.61,0.65, (0.15,0.19, (0.05,0.09, (0.45,0.48, (0.25,0.32,
0.85,0.89) 0.71,0.75) 0.27,0.31) 0.16,0.22) 0.54,0.59) 0.35,0.39)
V3 (0.75,0.79, (0.05,0.09, (0.25,0.32, (0.15,0.19, (0.61,0.65, (0.15,0.19,
0.85,0.89) 0.16,0.22) 0.35,0.39) 0.27,0.31) 0.71,0.75) 0.27,0.31)
Average (0.65,0.69, (0.27,0.31, (0.28,0.33, (0.08,0.12, (0.48,0.52, (0.18,0.23,
0.75,0.79) 0.38,0.43) 0.39,0.43) 0.20,0.25) 0.56,0.61) 0.30,0.34)
VS θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6
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average of individual preferences using d∗ (subject to fuzzy IC of linear order). Here
preference aggregation is molded by representing preference ordering as truth values over
trapezoidal fuzzy numbers.
The problem in Table 4 can be democratized in d∗ and d∗∗. The optimal fuzzy prefer-
ence function gives the solution for Table 4 as (θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4, θ5, θ6) = ((0.69, 0.69, 0.75,
0.79), (0.15, 0.19, 0.27, 0.31), (0.25, 0.32, 0.39, 0.42), (0.05, 0.09, 0.16, 0.22), (0.45, 0.48,
0.56, 0.59), (0.17, 0.22, 0.29, 0.31)) with minimum distance Dd∗ + d∗(w,average) = 1.925.
The optimal fuzzy preference function gives the solution for Table 4 as (θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4, θ5,
θ6)= ((0.65, 0.69, 0.75, 0.79), (0.27, 0.31, 0.38, 0.43), (0.28, 0.33, 0.39, 0.43), (0.08, 0.12, 0.2,
0.25), (0.48, 0.52, 0.56, 0.61), (0.18, 0.23, 0.3, 0.34))with minimum distanceDd∗∗ + d∗∗(w,
average) = 1.2864. Note that the uniqueness of the optimal solution is not guaranteed.
Discussion
We have assumed that agents have only ‘epistemic’ preferences, i.e., they only care about
the ‘distance’ between the collective preference set which is collectively calculated and
the individual preference set they personally decide (see [23]). This distance was origi-
nally measured by d∗ where P is a finite set of propositional letters standing for atomic
propositions. We re-scale this distance to form a new distance measure:
d(p, q) = d
∗(p, q)
4 × |P| .
Now this re-scaling makes d(p, q) ∈[0, 1] . Let pi be the profile of individual i. Individual
i receives fuzzy ‘utility’ if the collective preference set is collectively accepted, given by
the formula ui(q) = η(di(pi, q)) ∈[0, 1], where η :[0, 1]→[0, 1] is the strong fuzzy negation
(see [14]) that satisfies:
1. η(0) = 1, η(1) = 0.
2. η is nonincreasing.
3. η(η(x)) = x.






di(pi, q) = n. Choosing a collective preference set q which minimizes∑
∀i
di(pi, q) is therefore equivalent to choosing q which maximizes
∑
∀i
ui(q), i.e., the sum
of individual utilities. As a result, optimization problems in Tables 3 and 4 can be viewed
as social utility maximization problems.
Conclusion
Policy makers could be allowed to opt for trapezoidal fuzzy numbers to express their pref-
erences. It not only gives freedom of expression to the decision makers but also provides
us with a wider range of fuzzy connectives that can be used according to the nature of
the problem. In this paper, a democratic fuzzy aggregation approach for trapezoidal fuzzy
numbers is used to find an interpretation having the least distance with the profile of indi-
vidual preference sets and avg set. The authors believe that the preference aggregation
modeling for trapezoidal fuzzy numbers will have tremendously useful applications. Our
aggregation procedure is an improvement of Pigozzi’s [24] aggregation method (in the
context of binary logic) because cases of dictatorship are highly unlikely in our method.
Our aggregation procedure did not give a unique solution. A tie-breaking method can
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be used in the case of our optimal solution as it is not unique. Assume that we have a
preference set C¯ = (average(πi(P1)), average(πi(P2)), . . . , average(πi(P|P|))). Set C¯ might
violate the fuzzy integrity constraints. Solutions could be narrowed down by picking solu-
tions which are at a minimal distance from C¯ with the help of the tie-breaking method.
Another useful method is the aggregation function from the optimal solution, which has
minimal disagreement with other aggregation functions, using a dissimilarity or distance
measure. However, the important question is, how well behaved is our aggregation oper-
ator. We want the collective preference set to be responsive to the individual preference
set, and we also want the collective preference set to obey rationality constraints. How-
ever, it does not ensure collective rationality. Distance-based operators are used to obtain
collective rationality results in a situation of tie or indecision. Fuzzy aggregation meth-
ods are useful to construct democratic fuzzy social preference aggregation functions as
already given in the previous discussions.
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